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THE WAR AS A CAUSE OF CHINA'S TROUBEES/
BY GILBERT REID.
THE truth as to China's trouhles. comphcations and misfortunes
cannot he understood without the knowledge of the great first
cause of all these conditions. This primary cause was the Great
War, or, more specifically, the entrance of the war into Chinese
territory. If war had heen kept away from China, it is unlikely
that any of her present trouhles or her bondage to Japan would
haYe happened. Also it is probable that the Republic of China and
democratic principles w^ould haYC been proved adaptable to Chinese
thought and conditions.
The Chinese government, realizing possible danger of conflict
on the territories leased to Great Britain. France and Germany, as
also to Japan, proposed a plan for neutralization, thus making these
territories as neutral as all the territories under Chinese control.
Xo obstruction came to the |)roi)Osition from Germanv. She
was as anxious to keep the war away from Tsingtao as China was
to keep it away from the whole of the China coast. The German
Minister, finding that Japan was delaying to give consent to the plan
of neutralization, went so far as to negotiate with the Chinese gov-
ernment for transfer to China of complete authoritv over the
German-leased area of Kiaochow. This re-cession to China was
even brought to the attention of the American government by the
Chinese go\ernment. Events were sweeping on with electric speed,
and this plan, like the other, failed of consummation. Japan's
speed was too great for the rest of the world.
Should these negotiations come to naught, it was the wish of
1 [The following article is portion of a chapter from Dr. Reid's forth-
coming book, China, Captiz'C or Free' Dr. Rcid, organizer and director of
the International Institute, Shanghai, China, spent practically the whole period
of the war in the Far East. --Ed.]
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China, that if war by any means should approach the China coast,
it should avoid the treaty ports, such as Shanghai, Tientsin or
Canton, and be restricted to the limited areas held under lease by
the nations at war.
The places likely to be affected under these conditions were the
British leasehold of Kowloon (opposite to Hongkong), her lease-
hold of Weihaiwei on the north coast of the Shantung peninsula,
and the German leasehold of Kiaochow, with fortifications at Tsing-
tao, on the south coast of the Shantung peninsula.
Much, therefore, depended on the respective purposes of mind
of the two antagonists, England and Germany, or, more properly,
on the British and German governments. Much also depended
on the tendency of the Japanese government toward war or toward
peace, toward helping China and Yuan Shih-kai to remain neutral or
toward embroiling China in the many complications incident to war
at one's own door. As for Japan, jealous of Yuan Shih-kai since
the early antagonisms over Korean aft'airs and averse to China's
experiment in a democratic government, she was more likely to
make it hard for China than easy. When China formally requested
that Japan use her influence to render China immune from warlike
activities, the reply was that the time was not ripe to consider the
proposal and that Japanese action awaited the war measures of
Great Britain.
As for Great Britain and Germany, everything depended on the
war schemes of the home governments and on the larger issues of
military strategy. In a word, China's fate rested not with the
thought of peoples but with imperialistic governments, engaged in
the great but perilous game of war. The entrance of Japan into
the war was not popular with the Japanese people ; and as for the
majority of British residents in China, there was sympathy felt
for China and dread of coming trouble, if Japan should enter the
fray. It was not until the British government took action, that the
British resident in the Far East began to discipline himself into
enjoying the new condition of Japan as an ally waging war on
Chinese soil.
As for the German government, it sent on August 12 the follow-
ing telegram to its ambassador in Tokyo
:
"East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against
England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese
government."
The Japanese government gave no reply, as it had given no
favorable response to the proposals of China.
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The German government, while anxious that Tsingtao should
not be attacked, did the fair thing by making no attack or threat of
attack on either British or French leased territories or on their
colonial possessions. Russian Madivostock also remained immune.
The German attitude toward China was thus a considerate one.
What is most significant, as giving proof that Tsingtao was
not to be used as a base for naval operations, the German Pacific
squadron having left the China and Japan Seas in the summer
months, sailed toward the southern Pacific waters, and all that re-
mained behind was what an Englishman has described as "only
obsolete craft."
In early August, when war was declared, most of the German
Pacific Squadron, under Admiral von Spee, were cruising in the
South Seas among German colonial islands, and instead of aiming
for the China Sea and the Tsingtao naval base went southward
along the coast of South America. C^nly one ship, the Emden,
came into Tsingtao harbor with despatches from the Admiral, but
by August 4, along with four colliers "apparently proceeded to
cruise in the neighborhood of Madivostock where she captured a
Russian auxiliary cruiser and one or two merchant ships, before
going south to make history in the Bay of Bengal." The author
from whom I quote. Commander Spencer Cooper, then outlines
five possible objects which the German Admiral may have had in
mind in this peculiar naval strategy. Among these there is no
mention of any purpose to wage war in either the China or Japan
Seas. He concludes that the object "likely to yield a richer harvest"
than any other scheme was "to harass our trade with South Amer-
ica." For Britain or even Japan to make the attack in that part of
the broad Pacific was legitimate.
The German squadron ultimately consisted of the Scharnhorst,
Gneisenau, Leipzig. Dresden and Xiirnberg. under Admiral von
Spee. The Emden, as I have said, started forth on a raiding ex-
pedition of its own in the southern Pacific and the Indian Ocean
Another Englishman, W. L. \\'}llie. also writes : "The German
Squadron was in the Carolinas." at the opening of the war. and
"curiously enough, made no attempt to return to their base at
Tsingtao." "During August and the first half of September, Count
von Spec's ships steamed about in the South Pacific." On October
30 the squadron was about fifty miles west of \'alparaiso. On
November 1 there came the battle with Admiral Craddock's ships,
the Good Hope and the IMonmouth. in which the latter were sunk,
the British defenders dving an heroic death.
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The German purpose was to restrict the war to Europe. There
was no desire to tempt the enemy to attack Tsingtao. If any fight-
ing should take place, far away from the center of military action,
let it be on the high seas and not in a neutral country like China.
A battle between the British and Gemian fleets on any ocean would
have been legitimate, bringing no harm to others. For either fleet
to take possession of the island colonies of the other country was
also a fair game in war. But there was dynamite in the proposal
that an attack be made on Tsingtao. still remaining under Chinese
sovereignty, and situated on the China coast.
To infringe on the neutral rights of Belgium may have been
construed by the German Staft" as a "military necessity," but for
Germany or Great Britain or any one else there was no "military
necessity" to thrust the European War into the Ear East, on to
Chinese soil, for the attack of either Weihaiwei of Tsingtao. For
a few thousand isolated Germans, 4500 in all, to be subjugated
by any kind of enemy forces, whatever the flag, could have no bear-
ing on the ultimate issue of the war, either for or against Germany.
"Foreign leased territories in China," says Thomas F. ^.lillard, "were
only pawns in the war, and could have been eliminated without
affecting in the slightest degree the essential strategical zones of
operations."
If the combined naval forces of Russia, France and Great
Britain w^ere insufiicient to vanquish Tsingtao, it would have been
better if they had preserved the peace in the Far East by keeping
war nearer home and by using peaceful means in relation to the
Far East. Being unnecessary, uncalled for, a mere incident in a
mighty struggle, such belligerent activities should have been dis-
coiuitenanced. all the more that China's national entity and well-
being might be impaired or imperiled. This was the view I took at
the time, thinking of China's interests. What has happened since
has confirmed me in this view. To bring the war from Euro]ie to
Asia has been a calamity to China, though so worked as to be a gain
to Japan. Marcjuis r)kuma was no doubt right in thinking that the
new circumstances aft'orded Ja])an "the one opportunity of 10,000
years." As for China they brought the one catastrophe of 10.000
years. As between Great Britain and Germany, the blow which
Germany received in the loss of Tsingtao and the glory which
Great Britain received have been too insignificant to deserve a
passing thought. The one serious matter is the harm wrought to
China through the inevitable consequences of an unjust war. It
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is here that friends of China may he allowed to criticize in calm
discriminating spirit the action of the various governments con-
cerned in bringing Europe's war into Asia.
We now come to another question, one more of fact than of
opinion: JVIiich country brought the z^'or into China, in the attack
on Tsingtao, Japan alone or Ja})an in conjimction with Great Britain?
The world is anxious to know what nation brought on the war
in Europe. Many in China are equally anxious to know who was
the guilty party to bring on war in China. Will the guilty be made
to sufifer?
Most writers and speakers have been accustomed to refer to
Japan as the guilty interloper. Few Americans or Britishers, espe-
cially those living in the Far East, have such regard and admiration
for Japan that they are eager to exonerate her through a division
of the degrees of culpability. An easier way of rendering judgment
is to assume one's own innocence and cast all blame on one indi-
vidual or on one nation. So far as this is done, Japan is unfairly
treated, and the cause of justice dishonored.
Xow as to the origin of the war in the Far East. Baron Kato,
Minister of Foreign Afifairs, in a speech in the Diet on September 4
said: "Early in August the British government asked the Imperial
government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance." Then, after recounting the terms of this alliance, he
continued : "Therefore, inasmuch as we were asked by our ally for
assistance. .. .we could not but comply to the request to do our
part." And again: "The Japanese government therefore resolved
to comply with the British request, and if necessary to open hostil-
ities against Germany."
The British government has never denied the statement of fact,
or charge, if you so desire to call it. that the British government
asked for the assistance of Japan. The actual documents of the
negotiations have not been made public, but the results are so ob-
vious that they reveal the "inner consciousness" of the two govern-
ments. In a true technical sense, Japan was the only ally which
Great Britain had. The relations of Great Britain and France were
only of an entente cordiale.
The London Times on August 18, some two weeks before
Baron Kato made his speech in Tokyo, used these words
:
'Tt should be said at once that the Japanese intervention has
not taken place without full consultation with Great Britain."
Later on. under date of September 25, the London Times used
stronger language
:
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"We appealetl to our ally in the terms of the treaty, and she
has answered that appeal with the loyalty we have learned to expect
of her. . . .Japan had no desire to intervene in the war. She had
done so, the Emperor and his ministers tell us, because she could
not break her promises."
I remember how indignant Britishers in Shanghai were when
I ventured to use the same word, "appeal," in referring to the form
of application which Great Britain made to Japan.
According to Jefferson Jones (a noin dc plume), who was
familiar with the facts as they took place in Tokyo, the Japanese
government on August 2, expressed to the British a willingness to
put in force the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and by August 7, the
British Ambassador in Tokyo "handed to the Foreign Office at
Tokyo a request that Japan join in the European war."
The American diplomat \Y.W. Rockill, in an address which he
delivered in New York, November 12, the last before his death,
gave utterance to this careful statement : "The action of Japan was
taken after consultation with the ally. Great Britain, and. inferen-
tially, with the approval of France and Russia."
Mr. Kawakami, who is in a position to know, describes how
the war plan of Japan was set in motion by the British government,
even prior to Britain's declaration of war against Germany. These
are his words
:
"The assertion that Japan thrust herself upon the war without
England's invitation is as sinister as it is unwarranted. Japan did
not join hands with England without England's request. When it
became evident that England must come to the rescue of France
and Belgium, the press of Japan, without exception [notice the
words] , hoped that Japan would not be called upon to aid her
western ally. But the western ally did call upon Japan.
"On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war on
Germany, the British Ambassador to Japan hurried back to Tokyo
from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with
Baron Kato, Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Am-
bassador informed Baron Kato that his government was compelled
to open hostilities against Germany and that it desired to ascertain
whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests
in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities.
"Baron Kato answered that the question put to him was such
a serious one that he could not answer it on his own account.
"On the evening of the same day Count Okuma convened a
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meeting of all the Cabinet members. Rearing the resolution of this
meeting. Baron Kato. on August 4. called upon the British Am-
bassador and told the latter that Japan would not shirk the respon-
sibilities which the alliance with England put upon her shoulders.
"At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to aid
England for at least a few months. But on August 7, the British
Ambassador suddenly asked for an interview with Baron Kato and
told the Eoreign Minister that the situation had developed in such
a manner as to oblige England to ask for Japan's assistance without
delay. On the evening of that day Premier ( )kuma requested the
'elder statesmen' and his colleagues to assemble at his mansion. The
conference lasted until two o'clock the next morning. Before it ad-
journed the policy of Japan was definitely formulated.
"What caused Downing Street to invite Japan's cooperation
so soon is not clearly known to the outside world. But the Japanese
press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and England
were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate the German
scheme to transfer Kiaochow to the Chinese government before
Germany was compelled to surrender it at the point of the sword.
[An interesting confession as bearing on an easy way for China to
get back Kiaochow.] Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this
scheme she would still have enjoyed in virtue of Article five of the
Kiaochow Convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some
future time 'a more suitable territory' in China. [And why not, if
other nations were to have territory!] This was exactly the con-
dition which the Allies did not want to see established in China.
[And what about China's wishes or agreement?] If. on the other
hand, Germany were forced to abandon Kiaochow by the arbitra-
ment of the sword, China Avould no longer be under obligation to
'cede to Germany a more suitable place.' [How considerate of
China.]"
It may be taken for granted that the British government—not
the British people, still less the British resident in China—while
approving and even desiring the military assistance of Japan in the
initial stages, was not bound to approve of all that Japan did, into
the very end of the war. But an alliance is oftentimes a burden
to either ally as well as a prolific source of evil to others. Hence,
if we desire to overlook the personal factor, we may lay the blame
for these unfortunate transactions in China to so impersonal a
factor as the Anglo-Japancse Alliance, just as we may blame the
horrors and evils of the whole war, not on Germany or Russia or
Britain, but on z^^ar.
